The sixteen chapters of Josiah Royce for the Twenty-first Century are papers from the Fourth Annual Conference on American and European Values / International Conference on Josiah Royce, held at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Opole, Poland in June 2008. The presentation of diverse perspectives, and the development of many distinctive, promising strands of inquiry from the spring of Royce s work, establish that Royce offers significant resources for a number of areas of contemporary philosophy. The book is organized into four parts: (I) Historical Reinterpretations, (II) Ethics: Interpretations of Loyalty, (III) Religious Philosophy, and (IV) Contemporary Implications. Section I considers Royce s position in the history if ideas, with papers on his account of individuation, his expansion on a key idea from Kant, his use and contribution to mathematical and philosophical conceptions of the infinite and the absolute, and his adaptation of Peircean semiotics. Sections II and III consist of focused readings of Royce s work regarding ethics and religious philosophy, respectively. Section IV is the most diverse in the topics covered, with papers that bring Royce into contemporary discussions of psychology, of the problem of reference, of Rortyan neo-pragmatism, and of literary aesthetics. The purpose of the Opole conference was to elicit fresh perspectives on the work of Josiah Royce from an international group of contributors. This collection achieves that aim by presenting new approaches to relatively familiar writings, by drawing out promising implications of Roycean themes, and by making genuinely new applications of his ideas. Josiah Royce for the Twenty-first Century presents a rich interaction among a diverse mix of commentators, who retrieve and construct promising new insights from the work of one of America's greatest thinkers."

Know Thyself: An Essay in Social Personalism proposes that social Personalism can best provide for self-knowledge. In the West, self-knowledge has been sought within the framework of two dominant intellectual traditions, order and the emerging self. On the one hand, ancient and medieval philosophers living in an orderly hierarchical society, governed by honor and shame, and bolstered by the metaphysics of being and rationalism, believed persons gain self-knowledge through uniting with the ground of their being; once united they would understand what they are, what they are to be, and what they are to do. On the other hand, Renaissance and modern thinkers such as Pico della Mirandola, Copernicus, Descartes, Locke, and Kant shattered the great achievement of the high middle ages and bequeathed to posterity an emerging self in a splintered world. Continuing their search for self-knowledge, the moderns found themselves faced with the dualism of the emerging self of the Renaissance and the natural world as understood by modern scientists. New problems spun out of this dualism, including the mind-body problem; the other minds problem; free will and determinism; the nature and possibility of social relationships; values, moral norms and their relationship to the natural and social worlds; and the relationships between science and religion. Finding self-knowledge among these splinters without a guiding orientation has proven difficult. Even though luminaries such as Spinoza, Berkeley, and Hegel attempted to bring order to the sundered elements, their attempts proved unsatisfactory. We contend that neither order nor the emerging self can adequately provide for self-knowledge. Since those culturally embodied "master narratives" lead us to an impasse, we turn to social Personalism. Self-knowledge developed in this book shows how persons in relation to the Personal learn who they are, what they are to become, and what they must do to achieve that goal. It also shows that the achievement of self-knowledge is supported by a natural, social, and cultural environment rooted in trust. In this humane and timely discussion, Thomas O. Buford offers a personalist understanding of self-knowledge that avoids the impersonalisms that erode the dignity of persons and their moral life which characterize modern life.

The thesis of this book is that only a social personalism and no form of impersonalism can adequately account for the solidarity and stability of what we individuals share with all other members of our society, our second nature. In the ancient world the discussion of society, at least since Plato and Aristotle, began with the social nature of individuals as found in families and proceeded to topics such as the formation and the well ordering of societies according to eternal principles grasped by reason. Since the beginning of the modern world, at least since Hobbes and Locke, the discussion of society began with the relation of persons and society and then moved on to other topics, usually political and legal ones. The central problem was to find the basis on which individuals formed societies and how they could do so. Buford's question is with a more basic issue: "What do individuals and society share in common?" or what philosophers since Cicero have called our second nature, and how to best understand its unity and stability. The crisis of our culture in the erosion of both solidarity and stability pointedly manifests itself in our second nature. There the culture in which we live is felt, lived, and shared. Buford asks how we can lay bare our second nature, revealing the extent of the crisis. Our second nature is the form of social actions of persons in triadic relations, and Buford argues that it is there that we find that trust unifies a society and provides the basis for the institutions that stabilize it.